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Introduction 
Although convertible bonds (CBs) have been more popular and issued more frequently, 
bonds with detachable warrants (BWs) became the preferred equity linked financing 
instrument in Japan and Korea until recently. However, as the evasive issuances of 
detachable BWs became widespread in Korea, the Korean government decided to ban 
their issuance entirely in 2013, resulting in the death of BW issuance markets. Previ-
ous empirical studies on the wealth effects of CBs and BWs have looked at abnormal 
stock returns at the announcements of CB and BW issues, but the results are mixed. The 
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of bonds with detachable warrants, the change in firm value is strongly correlated with 
large shareholder ownership concentration and issuance form, and the effect of growth 
on firm value is strongly correlated with the cash flow condition of the issuing firm. The 
results indicate that the ownership structure and the cash flow condition of the issuing 
firm and the form of issuance are important determinants of the relationship between the 
issuance of bonds with detachable warrants and firm value; these results are applicable 
to an analysis of the mixed market reactions of convertible bonds or bonds with warrants 
issues across different countries. They also offer the policy implication that the Korean 
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rants may have been excessive. 
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empirical results on the relationship between both CB and BW issuance and growth are 
ambiguous as well. These observations motivate us to investigate the effect of detach-
able BW issuance on firm value and growth.
This paper examines what effect the issuance of detachable BWs would have on firm 
value and whether its side effects are grave enough to justify the Korean government’s 
prohibition, even for public offerings, let alone private placements. We investigate if 
the increase in ownership of large shareholders due to detachable BW issuance would 
adversely affect firm value. We argue that the effect of detachable BW issuance on firm 
value may differ depending on the ownership levels of large shareholders, as evidenced 
by Wruck (1989).
The second objective of this paper is to examine how growth affects firm value dif-
ferently when detachable BWs are issued depending on the cash flow situation of the 
issuing firm. The effect of growth on firm value when detachable BWs are issued may 
depend on whether the money raised is used for investment expansion to pursue growth 
opportunities. Some firms with high growth rates and many positive NPV projects may 
have difficulty with external financing due to the adverse selection problem created by 
the information asymmetry between shareholders and bondholders. We claim that, for 
these firms, an increased growth rate will affect firm value positively when detachable 
BWs are issued. However, if the money financed through the detachable BWs are used 
for purposes other than investment or only cause an overinvestment problem, the op-
posite result may ensue. 
Additionally, we examine whether there are differences in the effect of detachable BW 
issuance on firm value between a public offering and a private placement, since a private 
placement of detachable BW issuance not only causes agency problems such as asset 
substitution but also increases the possibility that it will be abused as a roundabout way 
to increase the ownership of large shareholders. Furthermore, we compare the KOSPI 
(Korea Composite Stock Price Index) market to KOSDAQ (Korea Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotation) market and compare chaebol firms to non-chaebol firms to see 
if the effect of detachable BW issuance on firm value differs between the two groups. 
This paper contributes to an understanding of the relationship between detachable BW 
issuance and firm value. We find that the change in firm value at the issuance of detach-
able BWs is strongly correlated with the ownership concentration level of large share-
holders. Hence, the wealth effects of BWs (including CBs) should be mixed, as evi-
denced when the ownership concentration level is not considered. We also find that the 
effect of growth on firm value at the issuance of detachable BWs is strongly correlated 
with the cash flow condition of the issuing firm. Hence, the relationship between growth 
and firm value at the issuance of detachable BWs should be mixed, as evidenced when 
the cash flow condition of the issuing firm is not considered. The results are applicable 
to an analysis of the mixed evidence of stock market reactions to the announcements 
of CBs or BWs issued from countries around the world. Another contribution of this 
paper is providing empirical evidence that detachable BW issuance in a public offering 
affects firm value positively, supporting the arguments that the Korean financial authori-
ties should allow the issuance of detachable BWs for public offerings. 
903
Journal of Business Economics and Management, 2016, 17(6): 901–915
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 2 develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the dataset and dis-
cusses the research methodology. Section 4 reports and discusses the empirical results, 
and the last section concludes the paper.
1. Literature review
Several studies argue the positive effect of BW issuance on firm value. Green (1984) 
suggests that BWs can reduce the agency problem between bondholders and equity-
holders, mitigating incentives for existing shareholders to engage in asset substitution. 
Jinn (2011) argues that, when firms have an underinvestment problem and cannot raise 
money in the public markets due to the adverse selection problem despite their growth 
opportunities, BW issuance in the form of private placements may positively affect firm 
value. Rahim et al. (2014) report that BW issuance positively affects firm value due to 
the tax effect for profitable firms. However, other studies claim that BW issuance affects 
firm value negatively. Miller and Rock (1985) argue that an external financing decision 
involving equity options such as BWs may reveal that management perceives the eq-
uity to be overpriced, resulting in a decline in firm value. Hennessy and Tserlukevich 
(2004) refute the view in Green (1984) by claiming that no warrant can eliminate asset 
substitution when the firm chooses volatility dynamically. 
Meanwhile, the empirical literature on the wealth effects of the announcements of CBs 
and BWs is abundant, but the results are mixed across countries (Rahim et al. 2014). 
Studies in the US report significantly larger negative abnormal returns for both CBs and 
BWs than for those issued in other countries (Billingsley et al. 1990; Lewis et al. 2003). 
Kang et al. (1995, 1999) report insignificantly negative abnormal return for CBs and 
significantly positive abnormal return for BWs in Japan. Yoon (2015) reports that the 
short-term and long-term wealth effects of the issuances of privately-placed detachable 
BWs are different, depending on whether warrants are sold to the affiliated persons such 
as CEO or large shareholders in Korea.
Detachable BW issuance can change large shareholder ownership, which in turn affects 
firm value. Although there is substantial literature about the relationship between owner-
ship and firm value, there is little research on how the ownership change due to warrant 
exercise after BW issuance affects firm value. Johnson et al. (2000) suggest that an 
increase in large shareholder ownership concentration can affect firm value negatively 
since it will boost managerial entrenchment, thereby fostering inefficient resource allo-
cation within the firm and making it a more difficult acquisition target. According to the 
entrenchment hypothesis, owner–managers can avoid the threats of layoff and pursue 
their personal interests more easily by increasing their ownership concentration (Stulz 
1988; Farinha 2003). Contrariwise, the convergence of interest hypothesis suggests that 
an increase in large shareholder ownership concentration can affect firm value positively 
since it will alleviate the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers (Morck 
et al. 1988; Davies et al. 2005). 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that, if large shareholders are owner–managers or control 
professional managers effectively, the conflict of interest between minority sharehold-
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ers and managers will decrease, producing a positive effect on firm value. In particu-
lar, prior empirical studies on the relationship between ownership and firm value have 
reported mixed results (Villalonga, Amit 2006; Vintilă, Gherghina 2014). Furthermore, 
Wruck (1989) finds that the relationship between changes in ownership and changes in 
firm value depends on both the changes in ownership and the resulting ownership levels. 
Therefore, examining what effect detachable BW issuance has on firm value requires 
that we consider the ownership changes and the ownership levels of large shareholders 
at the same time. 
Interestingly, theoretical models of the relationship between growth and firm value ad-
dress only the issuance of CBs, and the empirical results are unclear. Barclay and Smith 
(1995) argue that, with more growth options in the firm’s investment opportunity set, 
the conflict between stockholders and bondholders over the exercise of these options is 
greater, and stockholders have more incentives to reject positive NPV projects when the 
firm issues CBs. Contrariwise, Jen et al. (1997) claim that market-to-book ratio, asset 
growth rate, and profit growth rate show a positive correlation with stock returns and 
that the higher the future prospect of growth, the less negative the investor reaction to 
the announcement of CBs. 
2. Hypotheses 
2.1. The relationship between the issuance of detachable BWs and firm value
The relationship between detachable BW issuance and firm value may be positive for 
several reasons: BWs can mitigate agency costs and overinvestment problems, help 
firms with underinvestment problems and growth opportunities, and increase the value 
of interest tax shields. The relationship may also be negative: BWs may reveal that 
management perceive the equity to be overpriced, and they can also reduce ownership 
concentrations – revealing management pessimism or making the firm a more difficult 
acquisition target – and can be misused by large shareholders or managers for their own 
interests. Hence, the relationship between detachable BWs and firm value is an empiri-
cal matter. Our first null hypothesis is thus as follows:
H1: The issuance of detachable BWs will not affect firm value significantly.
2.2. Effect on firm value of the ownership changes  
of large shareholders from warrant exercise 
It is not clear whether the ownership changes due to BW issuance have a positive or 
negative effect on firm value because they can either boost managerial entrenchment or 
alleviate the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers. Following Wruck 
(1989), we predict that the effect on firm value of an increase in large shareholder own-
ership concentration from a warrant exercise will differ depending on the large share-
holder ownership levels. Therefore, we hypothesize that, when the large shareholder 
ownership level is very high, an increased large shareholder ownership will positively 
affect firm value, because the ownership increase from a warrant exercise will secure 
their management rights more firmly or help them govern professional managers more 
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effectively, and will not reduce the possibility of a takeover. Contrariwise, we hypoth-
esize that, when the large shareholder ownership level is very low, an increased large 
shareholder ownership will negatively affect firm value, because the ownership increase 
from a warrant exercise will increase the likelihood that they will pursue their own 
interests or fail to monitor professional managers, and will not increase the possibility 
of a takeover. Finally, we hypothesize that, when the large shareholder ownership level 
is neither very high nor very low, the effect on firm value of an ownership increase 
from a warrant exercise will be indecisive. We summarize our second null hypotheses 
as follows:
H2: The effect on firm value of a change in large shareholder ownership concentration 
from a warrant exercise will depend on the large shareholder ownership level.
H2-1: When the large shareholder ownership level is very high, an increase in that 
ownership concentration from a warrant exercise will positively affect firm value.
H2-2: When the large shareholder ownership level is very low, an increase in that own-
ership concentration from a warrant exercise will negatively affect firm value.
H2-3: When the large shareholder ownership level is neither very high nor very low, 
an increase in that ownership concentration from a warrant exercise will have an 
insignificant effect on firm value.
2.3. Effect of growth on firm value at the issuance of detachable BWs
When detachable BWs are issued, the effect of growth on firm value may depend on 
whether the money raised by BWs is used to increase investments and pursue growth 
opportunities. Consequently, we hypothesize that, when detachable BWs are issued, the 
effect of growth on firm value is not always positive but varies depending upon the cash 
flow situation of the issuing firm. Some firms with high growth rates and many positive 
NPV projects may have difficulty with external financing owing to the adverse selection 
problem created by the information asymmetry between shareholders and bondholders. 
In this case, when detachable BWs are issued, an increase in growth rate will affect 
firm value positively since the firm can solve the underinvestment problem caused by a 
chronically insufficient cash flow. On the other hand, we expect that, when detachable 
BWs are issued, an increase in growth rate will negatively affect the value of firms 
with good cash flows because the money financed through the detachable BWs can be 
used for purposes other than investment or cause an overinvestment problem. Thus, we 
summarize our third null hypotheses as follows:
H3: When detachable BWs are issued, the effect of growth on firm value will depend 
on the cash flow situation of the issuing firm.
H3-1: When detachable BWs are issued, the effect of growth on firm value will be 
positive if the cash flow situation of the issuing firm is poor.
H3-2: When detachable BWs are issued, the effect of growth on firm value will be 
negative if the cash flow situation of the issuing firm is good.
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3. Methodology
3.1. Data description
This paper examines listed Korean non-financial firms that issued detachable BWs from 
January 2000 to December 2011. A total of 721 issuances, including both public and 
private offerings, have been offered by 451 firms during the period. The data have been 
obtained from the Data Analysis, Retrieval, and Transfer (DART) System of the Korean 
Financial Supervisory Service and KISVALUE supplied by National Information and 
Credit Evaluation (NICE), one of Korea’s three credit rating agencies.
3.2. Model specification
We test our hypotheses through t-tests and panel regressions. We use a panel regression 
model because it can control for the time-invariant unobserved firm features that we 
think might be correlated with the explanatory variables in our model. Furthermore, 
pooling samples at different points in time provides more precise estimators and test 
statistics with more power:
 
 it 1 2 it 3 it 4 it 5 it it
6 it it 7 it 8 it 9 it 10 it 11 it
 12 it i it
FirmValue    BWdummy  AssetGr  Bigshare   BWdummy  AssetGr
BWdummy Bigshare   Profit   Lnsale Age  Leverage Deficit
FreeCashFlow u e .
=β + β + β + β + β × +




We use Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value (McConnell, Servaes 1990; Berger, Ofek 
1995). We employ this simple measure to avoid distortion due to the arbitrary assump-
tions about depreciation and inflation rates to estimate the firm’s replacement value 
(Martínez‐Sola et al. 2013). Moreover, Chung and Pruitt (1994) demonstrate that at least 
96.6% of the variability of Tobin’s Q is explained by the proxy market value of equity 
plus book value of total debt to book value of total assets.
We use three key variables, BW dummy, AssetGr, and Bigshare, to test our hypotheses. 
To see how detachable BW issuance affects firm value, we consider BW dummy vari-
able (1 for detachable BW-issuing firms and 0 otherwise). We consider AssetGr as a 
proxy variable for the asset growth rate. We include asset growth rate as an explanatory 
variable because high-growth firms that are vulnerable to agency costs and asymmetric 
information prefer to issue equity-linked securities (Lewis et al. 2003). We use Bigshare 
as a proxy variable for large shareholder ownership to measure the effect of changes in 
large shareholder ownership from a warrant exercise. Bigshare is measured by summing 
up the ownership percentage of the first large shareholder and that of its relatives and 
affiliated companies. Since the relationship between changes in ownership and changes 
in firm value depend on both the changes in ownership and the resulting ownership 
levels, as evidenced in Wruck (1989), we divide the sample into four equal groups 
based on the large shareholder ownership level (group 1 if ownership < 15%; group 2 
if 15% ≤ ownership < 21%; group 3 if 21% ≤ ownership < 29%; and group 4 if 29% ≤ 
ownership). Furthermore, to measure the interaction effects of detachable BW issuance 
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with growth and large shareholder ownership, we multiply the AssetGr variable and the 
Bigshare variable by the BW dummy variable, respectively. 
For control variables, we use Profit as a proxy variable for profitability, measured by 
EBIT (Earnings Before Interests and Taxes) divided by total assets, or the profitability 
of assets-in-place (Lewis et al. 2003). As low profitability increases the debt-related 
costs of external finance, low-profitable firms will prefer BWs as an external financing 
source. We use LnSale as a proxy variable for firm size, the natural logarithm of total 
sales (Krishnaswami, Yaman 2008; Eisdorfer 2011). We use Age as a proxy variable for 
firm age, defined as the natural logarithm of the difference between year 2011 and the 
year of the firm’s founding. We use Leverage as a proxy variable to analyze the impact 
of BW issuance on financial distress costs, measured as total debt divided by total as-
sets. We use Deficit as a proxy variable for deficit of money, measured by subtracting 
the summation of cash dividend payouts, net capital expenditure, change in net working 
capital, and the current portion of long-term debts from after-tax EBIT and then dividing 
by total assets. A significant lack of money increases the costs of debt financing; thus, 
the more serious the lack of money, the higher the chance that a firm will issue BWs. 
We use FreeCashFlow as a proxy variable for a firm’s cash flow situation, measured as 
total free cash flow divided by total assets. 
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis. The first 
column of Table 1 presents the statistics for the whole sample, showing that most vari-
ables have large standard deviations and skewed distributions. On average, Tobin’s Q is 
about 1.039, implying that the market value of Korean listed non-financial companies 
is almost equal to (or slightly less than) their book value. The average of AssetGr is 
0.267, showing a large difference in asset growth rates between firms, and the distribu-
tion of asset growth rates is highly skewed to the right. Large shareholder ownership, 
Bigshare, is 24.46% on average.
We use a parametric t-test to examine whether firm characteristics will differ between 
detachable BW-issuing firms and non-issuing firms (see Table 1). The averages of 
Tobin’s Q and AssetGr for detachable BW-issuing firms are significantly higher than 
those for non-issuing firms. The average of Bigshare for detachable BW-issuing firms 
is significantly lower than that for non-issuing firms, implying that there may be more 
incentives for the large shareholders of detachable BW-issuing firms to increase their 
shares from a warrant exercise. On average, detachable BW-issuing firms have a signifi-
cantly lower Profit, LnSale, Age, and FreeCashFlow but a significantly higher Leverage 
and Deficit than do non-issuing firms. Table 2, the correlation matrix, shows that there 
are no high correlations between independent variables, indicating the absence of a 
multicollinearity problem.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Variables





Obs. Mean Median S.D. Obs Mean Median Obs. Mean Median
Tobin’s Q 17773 1.04 0.85 0.99 5914 1.21 0.96 11859 0.95 0.81 0.25*** <.0001
AssetGr 17616 0.27 0.09 1.53 5848 0.36 0.11 11768 0.22 0.09 0.13*** <.0001
Bigshare 17885 24.46 22.37 17.09 5991 20.98 19.17 11894 26.22 23.94 –5.24*** <.0001
Profit 17774 0.05 0.05 0.16 5915 0.02 0.03 11859 0.07 0.06 –0.05*** <.0001
LnSale 17725 24.95 24.85 1.78 5889 24.32 24.29 11836 25.26 25.17 –0.94*** <.0001
Age 17913 23.12 21.00 15.58 6026 18.25 15.00 11887 25.58 24.00 –7.33*** <.0001
Deficit 17962 0.16 0.02 1.09 6060 0.16 0.02 11902 0.15 0.02 0.01 0.5744
Leverage 17964 0.44 0.44 0.37 6060 0.48 0.47 11904 0.43 0.42 0.05*** <.0001
FreeCashFlow 16643 0.00 0.00 0.33 5095 -0.01 0.00 11548 0.01 0.00 –0.02** 0.021
Note: ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
Source: authors’ calculations and estimation.
Table 2. Correlation matrix
Tobin’s Q AssetGr Profit LnSale Age Leverage Deficit FreeCashFlow Bigshare
Tobin’s Q 1
AssetGr 0.01 1
Profit –0.13*** 0.06*** 1
LnSale –0.02*** –0.12*** 0.14*** 1
Age –0.05*** –0.13*** –0.04*** 0.49*** 1
Leverage 0.26*** –0.02*** –0.25*** 0.07*** 0.04*** 1
Deficit 0.004 0.01* 0.02** –0.02*** –0.03*** –0.01 1
FreeCashFlow 0.01 –0.02*** 0.04*** 0.07*** 0.03*** –0.01 0.003 1
Bigshare 0.01* –0.06*** 0.06*** 0.18*** 0.08*** –0.02** –0.03*** –0.03*** 1
Note: ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
Source: authors’ estimation.
4.2. How does a detachable BW issuance influence firm value?
This section examines how detachable BW issuance affects firm value through a panel 
regression model. The coefficient of BW dummy in column (1) of Table 3 shows that 
detachable BW issuance has a negative and insignificant effect on firm value, support-
ing Hypothesis 1. Table 3 shows that the coefficient of AssetGr is significantly positive 
but that the coefficient of the interaction term BW dummy × AssetGr is significantly 
negative. This result may suggest that growth has a generally positive impact on firm 
value but that the effect of growth on firm value is smaller for detachable BW-issuing 
firms than for non-issuing firms. Table 3 also shows that the coefficient of Bigshare 
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is significantly negative but that the coefficient of the interaction term BW dummy × 
Bigshare is negative and insignificant. This result may suggest that an increase in large 
shareholder ownership has a generally negative effect on firm value but that the effect of 
a change in large shareholder ownership on firm value may be different for detachable 
BW-issuing firms than for non-issuing firms. 









BW dummy –0.017 (–0.526) 
BW dummy × AssetGr –0.156*** (–6.234) 
BW dummy × Bigshare –0.001 (–0.412) 








































Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firms group 1397 1397 1397
Total observations 13,570 13,570 13,570
Adjusted R-squared 0.475 0.477 0.475
F-statistic 9.755*** 9.814*** 9.755***
             Note: ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
             Source: authors’ estimates.
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4.3. How does a change in the large shareholder ownership  
from a warrant exercise affect firm value?
Table 4 shows the results concerning the relationship between the change in large share-
holder ownership and firm value depending on which group the large shareholder own-
ership level falls in. Column (4) shows the results when the level exceeds 30%. In this 
case, the interaction term BW dummy × Bigshare has a positive and significant coeffi-
cient (+0.179) at the 1% significant level, indicating that an increase in large shareholder 
Table 4. Effect on firm value of changes of large shareholder ownership  
from a warrant exercise
Variables
Tobin’s Q








BW dummy * Bigshare [0–14% ] –0.097* –(1.653)
BW dummy * Bigshare [15–20%] 0.004 (0.073)
BW dummy * Bigshare [21–29%] –0.039 –(0.611)


















































Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm groups 1397 1397 1397 1397
Total observations 13571 13571 13571 13571
Adjusted R-squared 0.475 0.475 0.475 0.475 
F-statistic 9.743*** 9.739*** 9.739*** 9.746*** 
Note: ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
Source: authors’ estimates.
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ownership concentration from a warrant exercise will have a strongly positive effect on 
firm value when the large shareholder ownership level is very high, which is consistent 
with Hypothesis 2-1. Column (1) shows the results when the large shareholder owner-
ship level is below 15%. In this case, the interaction term BW dummy × Bigshare has 
a negative and significant coefficient (–0.097) at the 10% significant level, indicating 
that an increase in large shareholder ownership concentration from a warrant exercise 
will have a negative effect on firm value when the large shareholder ownership level is 
very low, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2-2. Columns (2) and (3) show the results 
when the large shareholder ownership levels fall between 15% and 21% and between 
21% and 30%, respectively. These results are statistically insignificant, as predicted by 
Hypothesis 2-3. 
4.4. How does a change in growth rate affect firm value  
when detachable BWs are issued?
We divide the sample into two groups – one with more free cash flow than the aver-
age of all the firms in the sample and the other with less. Table 5 shows the results 
concerning the relationship between growth rate and firm value depending on the cash 
flow situation of detachable BW-issuing firms. Column (1) shows the results for the 
high free cash flow group. In this case, the interaction term BW dummy × AssetGr has 
a negative and significant coefficient (–0.194) at the 1% significance level, indicating 
that an increase in growth rate will have a strongly negative impact on firm value when 
the cash flow situation of the issuing firm is good, which is consistent with Hypothesis 
3-2. For the low free cash flow group, column (2) shows that the interaction term BW 
dummy × AssetGr has a statistically insignificant and negative coefficient, rejecting 
Hypothesis 3-1.
4.5. Comparisons between private and public offerings, KOSPI  
and KOSDAQ firms, and chaebol and non-chaebol firms
In this section, we examine only the firms that issue detachable BWs. Column (1) of 
Table 6 shows that the public dummy (1 for public offerings and 0 for private place-
ments) has a significant and positive coefficient (+0.107) at the 5% significance level, 
suggesting that the issuance of detachable BWs has a positive effect on firm value when 
it is issued in the form of a public offering rather than a private placement. This result 
is in line with the markets’ general concern about private sales of detachable BWs and 
also implies that public offerings of detachable BWs may not be as problematic as 
private placements in Korea.
Furthermore, Column (2) of Table 6 shows that the KOSPI dummy (1 for KOSPI firms 
and 0 for KOSDAQ firms) has a significant and negative coefficient (–0.286) at the 1% 
significance level, suggesting that detachable BW issuance has a negative effect on firm 
value when it is issued by KOSPI firms, a result perhaps influenced by the markets’ 
concerns about why KOSPI firms would issue detachable BWs even if they could use 
more general financing vehicles. Finally, Column (3) of Table 6 shows that the chaebol 
dummy (1 for chaebol firms and 0 for non-chaebol firms) has a positive but insignificant 
coefficient, suggesting that the effect on firm value of detachable BW issuance may not 
differ between chaebol and non-chaebol firms.
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Table 5. Effect of growth on firm value for detachable BW-issuing firms
Variables
Tobin’s Q

























Fixed effect Yes Yes
Firms group 667 830
Total observations 7915 9604
Adjusted R-squared 0.229 0.408
F-statistic 4.504*** 8.917***
          Note: ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
          Source: authors’ estimates.
Table 6. Comparisons between public and private offerings, KOSPI and KOSDAQ firms  
and chaebol and non-chaebol firms
Variables
Tobin’s Q







Public Dummy 0.107** (2.182) 
KOSPI Dummy –0.286***–(5.354)
Chaebol Dummy 0.075 (0.952)
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Variables
Tobin’s Q
(1) Public vs. Private (2) KOSPI vs. KOSDAQ (3) Chaebol vs. non-chaebol



































Fixed effects No No No
Firm groups 336 435 435
Total observations 3852 5018 5018
Adjusted 
R-squared 0.142 0.245 0.241
F-statistic 71.627*** 182.002*** 177.932***
Note: ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
Source: authors’ estimates.
Conclusions
We find that a change in large shareholder ownership concentration from a warrant exer-
cise affects firm value differently depending on the level of large shareholder ownership 
and that detachable BW issuance has a positive effect on firm value when it is issued 
in the form of a public offering. These findings should lead to a new discussion about 
whether the Korean government’s complete ban on detachable BWs was appropriate. 
We also find that the effect of growth on firm value at the issuance of detachable BWs 
is strongly correlated with the cash flow condition of an issuing firm.
These results indicate that the ownership structure and cash flow condition of the issuing 
firm and the form of issuance are important determinants of the relationship between 
the issuance of detachable BWs and firm value. To our knowledge, we are the first to 
empirically test these issues. Although the findings are derived from data on and an 
analysis of Korean firms, they are pertinent to other countries as well. Furthermore, they 
are applicable to the analyses of the mixed market reactions to CB and BW issuances 
across different countries and for different periods. 
End of Table 6
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This paper has two limitations. First, we do not consider the period from 2012 to 2013, 
during which many firms issued detachable BWs until the amendment to the Capital 
Markets and Financial Investment Business Act to prohibit listed companies from issu-
ing detachable BWs came into effect at the end of August 2013. Second, we could not 
examine how much the ownership concentration actually changed due to the exercise 
of warrants by large shareholder. 
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